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Criminal Justice: Adversary or Inquest; Did
Due Process Reform the Wrong System?
ROBERT EMMETT BURNS*
I raise this question, and I will overstate it to try to evoke a chal-
lenging response. I say that the adversary system is not the best
system of criminal justice and that there is a better way.**
HON. WARREN E. BURGER
Chief Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisprudence of fact-finding in the law of crimes and procedure
may sometimes appear festooned to the ages of its origins, history or
ideology. Even so, in an era of due process "Model Shopping"' ap-
propriate procedure, to the bench, jury, commission or sequel room,
deserve at least, the concern our forebears gave when in 1791 they
added to the Constitution some specific amendments, trial rights and
procedures2 applicable to National Government.
3
* Holy Cross (A.B.), Yale (J.D.); NYU (LL.M.); Professor, DePaul University
College of Law, Chicago.
** This statement was made in 1968 when Judge Burger then spoke on the United
States Court of Appeals at a 1968 Symposium on Criminal Justice. See Report, Center
Magazine, published by Fund for the Republic Center for the Study of Democratic
Institution (1968) at p. 3.
1. See Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1964);
Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or a Third "Model" of the Criminal
Process, 79 Yale L.J. 359 (1970); Birmingham, Models of Criminal Process, Game
Theory and Law, 56 Cornell L.R. 56 (Nov. 1970).
All models, be they ones of crime control, battle, family or puritan vintage, estimate
the relative place of efficiency versus humanity. At extremes might lie the largesse of
English Chancery practice, put to service of preliminary leisurely trial, appeal and
collateral attack versus the cruder vigilante justice least human, but most efficient.
2. U.S. Const. amend. IV. (Rules of Real Evidence); amend. V. (Miscellaneous
Procedures); amend. VI. (Speedy Public Trial by Adversary Jury Rights.
3. Federal Trial Procedures were not always required in State Courts. Chief
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At the passage of the Bill of Rights the king's former Colonies con-
ducted criminal trials according to adversary rules before a jury-a
"model" inherited from the 17th Century England.4  The adversary
system developed from old ideas of cause, ritual, ordeal,5 freedom of
contract, and sport theory, which contemplated that truth could best
be discovered in the clash of parties, opposing and reacting to each
other within the bounds of fairness and relevancy. The party-battle
trial when conducted before a number of people such as a jury of peers,
was a vast improvement for the colonial society accustomed to witch-
craft or,6 trial by wager, sword and self-evident eternals.
It was not however, the only system to discover truth that pre-
vailed in 17th Century Merry England.
A competing system of fact-finding, popular in European Clerical
and English Society, were procedures called "inquests," coming from the
Justice Marshall had written:
The question thus presented is, we think, of great importance, but not of
much difficulty. The constitution was ordained and established by the people
of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and for the
government of the individual states. Each state established a constitution for
itself, and in that constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on
the powers of its particular government, as its judgment dictated. Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242, 246-47 (1833).
Of the four states, (New Jersey, New York, Georgia and South Carolina)
that did not preface their constitution with a separate bill of rights, none se-
cured the right of self-incrimination. See Levy, Origins of the Fifth
Amendment, 405-432 (1968). . . . For a history of the privilege, see, 8
Wigmore, Evidence, § 2250 (1940). The Northwest territory did not include
the privilege; see, An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory
Northwest of the River Ohio, Act of Aug. 7, 1789, 1 Stat. 50-53.
Only Post 1890 construction to the phrase "Liberty" and "Due Process" incorporated
to State Courts all but perhaps the most "fundamental of 1787 amendments rights;"
the Second Amendment Right to Bear Arms. See Warren, The New "Liberty" under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431 (1925). "The word 'liberty' seemed
an especially convenient vehicle into which to pack all sorts of rights." Id., at 439;
Frankfurter, Memorandum on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," 78 Harv. L. Rev. 746.
4. See, in general, Selected Essays in Anglo American Legal History, by various
authors, compiled and edited by the Committee of the Association of American Law
Schools (1907); On Ancient Law; Maine, Ancient Law; A General Survey of Events,
Sources, Persons and Movements in Continental Legal History, by various European
authors, Little Brown (1912). Most standard tests discuss the Development of Coin-
purgation, Battle, the Ordeals and the Origins of the Inquest fury, Tracy; Handbook of
the Law of Evidence (1952); The Maguire Casebook on Evidence (5th ed.) traces
the court's power over juries by way of instruction and direction of verdict in the
Chapter "Burden of Proof." See, Note: The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nine-
teenth Century, 74 Yale L.J. 170 (1964).
5. At the time of the growth and development of the adversary model in England
there were other "trials" sometimes called "ordeals of truth." There was, for instance, a
practice of immersing suspects in cold water to discover the truth on a sink-or-float
basis. There was trial by battle. Experience with informal trial procedures in Eng-
land animated many a hasty trip to the New World. For a brief history, See, Tracy,
supra, note 4, at 1-8.
6. See, Tracy, Accounts in Fox, Science and Justice, The Massachusetts Withcraft
Trials (1970).
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Latin "Inquisito. ' '7  In inquisition procedure, fact-finding is combined
with investigation. A presidential commission, a grand jury, congres-
sional investigations or a coroner's hearing today would be character-
ized by their inquest procedure.7 a The classic difference between fact
finding by adversary trial and fact finding by inquest trial lies in the
supposed passivity of the fact-finder in the adversary trial, but his
"activism" at inquest justice.8  Judge, jury, prosecutor and defense
tended to be one in combination; at the inquest trial, all appearing pro
se, suspect "defendant" or person plain were simply called "Witness."
In recognition that both inquest and adversary fact models could pre-
vail in the same century and in the same country,' 0 the practice prevail-
ing by the late 18th Century should be illustrated here. The contrast
is striking."
7. Inquiry is a general term applicable to any question-for truth; investigation, a
query. For exmaple, and a question are related in connotation but the manner or
intensity to a question may provide in the process secondary meaning, "by their
bullying tactics, by their having turned needed investigations into regrettable inquisi-
tions . . ." Norman Thomas quoted in Webster's Third Unabridged Dictionary, 1167
(1961).
7a Since American law comes modeled from English practice inquest procedure,
there bears re-examination. The many refinements in modern continental trial pro-
cedure is beyond the scope of this paper.
8. Inquest Justice is most often remembered not so much because government was
judge and jury, but because inquisitions in Spain and Europe were associated with
burning, witches, and expropriating their property .... ." When torture and/or con-
fiscation became from time to time unlawful, the number of witches decreased dras-
tically or disappeared altogether." Currie, Crimes without Criminals, Witchcraft and
Its Control in Renaissance Europe, 3 Law and Society Review, 7 at 23-24 (1968).
9. See Silving, The Oath, 68 Yale L.J. 1329 (1959); Wigmore, A Panorama of
the World's Legal Systems (1936); Benthem, in his Rationale of Justice Evidence,
Specially Applied to English Practice, had, in 1827, attacked the rules excluding evi-
dence of a party to an action or prosecution. Party incompetency was abolished there
in 1898. The party versus witness distinction is to be underscore. At trials con-
ducted under adversary procedures defendant or his spouse could not, at common law,
testify at all. The mouth of an accused was closed at the legal adversary proceedings
until 1870 (Maine) and 1878 in National Federal Courts (Act of March 16, 1878,
20 Stat. 30). Only adversary trials conducted under adversary rules disqualified
person qua party from testimony. ("Nemo debet esse testis in propria cause.")
10. "But we notice that most of the church's religious investigations, the cause
of all the trouble, were conducted by means of commissions or inquisitions,
not by ordinary trials upon proper presentment; and then the very rule of the
canon law itself was continually broken, and persons unsuspected and unbe-
trayed, "per famam" were compelled, "seipsum procedure" to become their
own accusers." Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 Harv. L. Rev.
71, at 84 (1891).
When Church became Crown in England it was only to be expected that Common
Courts would adopt same or hybrid procedures. Ecclesiastical Courts were especially
interested in hearsay and treason.
11. See notes and bibliography in Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment, (p. 443-
544) (1968). His Chapter I is entitled "Rival Systems of Criminal Procedure," Lord
Coke of the 17th Century ascribed Fifteen Branches to English Law, each admin-
istered by its own judiciary; the law administered included Chancery, Admiralty,
Ecclesiastical and Star Chamber Law. See, 2 Holdsworth, A History of English Law
(1923), at 178-87.
Ecclesiastical Courts were, of course, inquest in nature, before and after church and
state, became Henry VIII.
For a series of Articles on Norman-Saxon English trial development, See J.B.
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ADVERSARY INQUEST
Civil and Criminal -Same
Proceedings alike1 2
Parties (or later their's  -Fact-finder asked the
Lawyers asked questions) witness questions14
Accuser-Private Person- -Accuser
Later (17th Cent.) State, Government
People or Government
Parties called and sponsored 15  -Trier called the witness' 7
their witnesses' 6
Party Chief Investigator18  -Fact-finder, Chief
Investigator
Thayer, Older Modes of Trial, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 45 (1891); The Jury and Its Develop-
ment, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 249, 293, 357 (1891).
12. One is struck by the similarities of the adversary civil jury trial for damages to
1971 criminal trial procedure in rules of examination, credibility and expert testimony.
Surely the state was once more than mere party in criminal cases. The people
should include victim and defendant. Historical development from adversary to in-
quest (1066-1640) and thereafter back to party adversary (1640-1688), may explain
why criminal cases people are aligned as party in same fashion as private individual
per civil party plaintiff. See, infra, note 33.
13. Legal defense attorneys are not essential to either adversary logic, or the party
system. The private aspect to counsel for party is underscored by the relatively late
developmental date in America when in capitol or general felony, indigents (who
commit most crimes) became entitled in State proceedings to appointment of counsel by
a due process constitution. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
14. Compulsory attendance of witness in civil cases was authorized in 1962 but
defendant in inquest-conducted criminal cases did not obtain the right to call witness
until the close of the 17th century. See I. Wigmore, Evidence, § 4 where he speaks of
Proceedings Conducted Ex Parte or by Administrative Tribunals Not Bound by the
Common Law; "Rules of Evidence" he says, citing James Bradley Thayer, "do not
apply ex stricto jure in any tribunal but a jury court," id., at 27.
15. In trial by oath helping, battle or compurgation, party, witness helper or ac-
cuser were "aligned" as per sponsorship. Under that system the line between a civil
action for contract of debt- and a criminal proceeding made little difference in trial
procedure. In trial by inquest, the parent of the modem "jury" there was no place
for "sponsorship" at all, for everyone but inquirer were witnesses. The transition in
the 15th, 16th and 17 Centuries from Norman inquest trial by government to adversary
trial by a party system albeit cum inquest jury explains how under adversary rules,
government or people become parties (thus encumbered by, in their case, the silly rule
that since prosecution called a witness they sponsored and could not impeach, etc.)
For a historical sketch, see Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness, New Develop-
ments, 4 U. Chi. L Rev. 69 (1936).
16. "As the change from the inquisitional to the adversary system came in
criminal cases, we first find . . . that the accused can not impeach his own
witness." Id., at 72.
17. Oath helping, trial by wager and by contest are older than the inquest refine-
ments regarded in their day as innovation to the extent that the jury would consider
outside witnesses or recognitors called but sponsored by no one (inquest stage).
See Moschzisker, The Historic Origin of Trial by fury, 70 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1921).
18. The meeting of the waters between pre-trial party compulsion and pre-trial
inquest compulsion may be dramatized from civil cases at the so-called pre-trial hearing
conducted before His Honor anxious for calendar currency, order, settlement and pre-
trial disposal. An aggressive pre-trial prodding judge is at odds with party adversary
expectations. Pre-trial procedures mollify or dilute adversary freedoms to fact presenta-
tion.
In criminal cases much of people's pre-trial investigation centers on out-of-court
Vol. 2: 249
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Confrontation: The Right -No special 'right' to cross-
to Cross-Examination 19  examine accusers
accusers
A public trial -Mostly private
Friends, Jury; Later Judge -Grand Jury, Judge, Petit
and Jury-Finder of Fact Jury, King, Prelate, Commission
Probate or Chancellor Fact-Finder
Bench defendant disqualified -All defendants treated like
to testify for himself. any other witness and encouraged
to speak out or else . . .20
(today contempt)21
Defendant sometimes confessed -Witness (defendant) sometimes
out of court his guilt confessed guilt at the trial
proceeding
When the United States Constitution was proposed for ratification by
States Legislatures or Conventions, some amendments were proposed
informal interrogation of probable cause arrestee, or 'focal' suspect, etc. A confession
obtained thereby through hearsay could be testified to or admitted at defendant's trial
as an admission by party.
19. Wigmore calls cross-examination "the greatest legal engine ever invented for
the discovery of truth." 5 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1367 at 29. Whether cross-examina-
tion is or was co-extensive with "confrontation" of accusers' witness under the Sixth
Amendment is a nice point. See the views in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1971); Comment, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 Yale L.J. 1434. A wit-
ness might be accuser or plain favorable. It is unquestionable that the Sixth Amend-
ment was intended to preserve an adversary rights package. See Pollitt, The Right of
Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. Pub. Law 381 (1959).
Self-incrimination, in the Fifth Amendment is addressed to "persons" but the Sixth
Amendment speaks of accused and accusers. The two modes explain today's doubts
whether confrontation is cross-examination.
20. It, of course, remains true today that a witness may be sentenced for contempt
of court or chair on failure to testify unless proper invocation to claim of privilege is
made. Brown v. U.S., 356 U.S. 148 (1958). After 1688 in England the practice of
interrogation accused parties on oath, examination and trial, fell into disuse for as
Stephens had put it in his General View of the Common Law of England:
The practice of courts up to the time of the Revolution of 1688 and for some
little time after, was that the prisoner should be questioned at his trial; and
till the year 1848 the committing magistrates were bound by statute to take
his 'examination' a word which naturally suggests questioning and was ju-
dicially held to justify it. Many illustrations of this occur in the State Trials,
p. 192. After referring to cases he proceeds: 'In the eighteenth century the
practice of questioning prisoners at their trial appears to have fallen into their
disuse, probably because during that period the theory that a criminal trial was
substantially a private litigation, constantly gained ground and was combined
with the reduction of the rules of evidence to a systematic form. Hence the
principle that a party was an incompetent witness would be supposed to forbid
the interrogation of the prisoner.'
Taken from Maury, Validity of Statutes Authorizing the Accused to Testify, 14 Am.
L.R. 748 at 755, 756 (1880). It seems almost redundant to point to the privilege to
decline self-incrimination as responsive to trial by inquest, where use of the rack and
screw upon defendant-witness suspect appears.
21. Civil contempt of court, chair, commission or Congress. See Beale, Contempt
of Court: Criminal and Civil, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 161 (1908) for contempt case growing
out of failure to answer questions before a grand jury inquest where witness had been
accorded incrimination immunity; See, In re Giancana, 352 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1965)
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965).
253
1971
Loyola University Law Journal Vol. 2: 249
and incorporated in 1791 to prevent misconstruction by the National
Government of its powers.22 Human rights and procedures applicable
to all proceedings under oath conducted by the new government were
provided by formal amendment.2
The heart of the Bill of Rights today is the Fifth Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment's most famous clause is the privilege against
self-incrimination. It provides as follows:
No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself .... 24
The privilege against self-incrimination has always been controver-
sial, for a first principle at all truth-gathering inquiries is supposed to
be (except in totalitarian countries) a concern for truth.25
When an ordinary witness says, "I decline to answer on grounds that
my answer will incriminate me," the fact-finder is denied access to
apparently relevant information.
The meaning and scope of evidence, privileges, i.e., who has them,
when they are waived, etc., is determined by the "Law of the Forum."
Most criminal forums are today, as then, state and local.
For 170 odd years, the Fifth Amendment was viewed as an evi-
22. The Preamble to the Bill of Rights reads as follows:
The Conventions of a number of the states having at the time of their adopting
the Constitution, expressed a desire in order to prevent misconstruction or
abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses shall be
added; And extending the ground of public confidence in the Government,
will best insure the beneficient end of its institution.
23. Adversary trial by jury was provided for by the Sixth Amendment. It was
argued that unless an amendment specifically guaranteed a jury in all civil cases, Fed-
eral Courts would be impliedly prohibited from that mode of trial. Hamilton, opposed
a civil jury amendment (no doubt mindful that Admiralty, Probate and Chancery oper-
ated under Civil and Common inquest or common law often without juries answered:
A power to constitute courts is a power to prescribe the mode of trial; and
consequently if nothing was said in the constitution on the subject of juries,
the legislature would be at liberty either to adopt that institution or to let it
alone. This discretion, in regard to criminal causes is abridged by an express
injunction, but it is left at large in relation to civil causes, for the very reason
that there is total silence on the subject. The specification of an obligation
to try all criminal causes in a particular mode excludes indeed the obligation
of employing the same mode in civil causes, but does not abridge the power
of the legislature to appoint that mode if it should be thought proper. The
pretense, therefore that the national elgislature would not be at liberty to
submit all the civil causes of federal cognizance to the determination of juries,
is a pretence destitute of all foundation. Hamilton v. The Federalist (Black-
well ed. 1948) at 425.
24. U.S. Const. amend. V.
25. There is no reason why our profession should not begin now to move in this
reform. Hallam calls this privilege 'that generous maxim of English law,' and
weigh in its favor. But this is one of the cases where we must be just before
we are generous. Every day, in some court of some city, justice is miscarrying
because of this extraordinary maxim (nothing in truth but a misquotation
consecrated by age), 'nemo teneter seipsum prodere.' Wigmore, supra, note 10
at 88.
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dence privilege from a code applicable only in federal courts.28 In
1964, however, the Fifth Amendment privilege, as the United States
Supreme Court would review it, was incorporated to state trial courts
by constitutional construction to the phrase, "due process of law":
We hold today that the Fifth Amendment's exception from com-
pulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment against abridgement by the states.2 7
In Malloy v. Hogan, the majority wrote:
The marked shift in the Federal Standard in state cases began
when the courts spoke of accused 'free choice' to admit, to deny or
to refuse to answer. The shift reflects recognition but the Ameri-
can system of crime is accusatorial not inquisitional and the Fifth
Amendment privilege is the essential mainstay. 28
Why did the Supreme Court make binding in all courts, on a one-
nation basis, a majority's view from time to time on self-incrimination?
Was it that a few years before Senator Joseph McCarthy, in the Nineteen
Fifties, had abused the rights of witnesses (the Fifth Amendment
Communist era).2 9 Congressional investigations were not supposed
to be trials of course at all?29a It must not be forgotten that once incor-
poration of a "clause" is made, the Supreme Court became exclusive,
nonappealable interpreter to appropriate depth extension, penumbras,
emanations, or umbrellas in cases under the clause.
One year after Malloy, the Court announced the famous Miranda
decision,30 making applicable new self-incrimination silent "rights" at
post-custody, but pre-trial police station interrogations:
The principles announced today deal with the protection which
26. Justice Frankfurter wrote in 1949:
The notion that the 'due process of law' guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is shorthand for the first eight amendments of the Constitution and
thereby incorporates them has been rejected by this court again and again,
after impressive consideration. See e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516;
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278;
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319. Only the other day the Court reaffirmed
this rejection after thorough re-examination of the scope and function of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46. The issue is closed. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 at 27.
That's what he thought. In twenty years every Frankfurter case cited was overruled
in the Due Process Revolution, Trial Vintage, infra, note 32. For other Due Process
Vintages, see Burns, The Death of E Pluribus Unum, 19 DePaul L.R. 651 (1970).
27. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 at 63 (1964).
28. id., at 7.
29. E.g., See Chase, The Libertarian Case for Making It a Crime To Be A Com-
munist, 29 Temp. L. Q. 121 (1956).
29a. One can only speculate on the subtle influence in 1950's trial thinking and re-
form of the self-incrimination privilege, abused by McCarren, Kefauver, Velde, Jenner
or McCarthy committees which regularly conducted open, T.V. hearing Fifth Amend-
ment inquests. At some of these "witch trials" many ordinary witnesses no doubt
thought they were "on trial."
30. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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must be given to the privileged against self-incrimination when
the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in
custody at the station or otherwise deprived of the freedom of ac-
tion in any significant way. It is at this point that our adversary
proceeding commences, distinguishing itself at the outset from in-
quisitional systems, recognized in some countries. 31
Malloy proceeded on the assumption that the self-incrimination clause
was to mainstay adversary rights; Miranda applied this logic to police
interrogation not conducted under oath. Thus the Supreme Court in
this, the Warren era, proceeded to reform or restore by due process
rule-making, the entire area of adversary justice.8 2
Indeed, the sell-incrimination privilege was the mainstay right not
under the adversary system at all but of its opposite, the inquest."3
The accused needed no rights to silence at trial by adversary. His
right to testify under an accusatorial but adversary trial system did not
31. Id., at 577.
32. Defendant is entitled to confront and cross-examine his accusers, Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), but need not testify himself, and it is uncon-
stitutional to comment on his failure to testify, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965). Defendant must be convicted by sufficient and untainted legal
evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of all (usually
12) jurors. Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968). Defendant, except in
petty cases, Dyke v. Tyler Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968), has a con-
stitutional right to trial by jury, Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). The
right includes right to a speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967). Defendant is entitled at all times to be sponsored by Counsel,
Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957), accorded one-way discovery, Clewis
v. Texas, 386 U.S 707 (1967) (dicta), and counsel on appeal, Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). At all times defendant must be shielded
from improper trial publicity, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 233 (1966), and
must be convicted only on untainted evidence, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). Real evidence must have been obtained fairly, pursuant to the more
than one hundred rules of the Supreme Court in the search and seizure area,
See LaFave, Search and Seizure: The Course of True Law . . . Has Not
. . Run Smooth, 1966 U. of II. L. F. 255. Confessions are admissible but
must they comply with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Voluntari-
ness must not be left exclusively to the jury, United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570 (1967).
Line up testimony if considered unfair is inadmissible unless counsel for de-
fendant was notified of lineup, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 219 (1967).
Every violation of a Constitutional decision is deemed grounds for reversal
unless the state proposes it to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). From the Code of Constitutional
Procedure enacted for the State Courts by the United States Supreme Court
by construction to a phrase, due process of law.
33. Every statement of counsel operated as a question to the prisoner and in-
deed they were constantly thrown into the form of questions, the prisoner
either admitting or denying or explaining what was alleged against him. The
result was that, during the period in question, the examination of the pris-
oner, which is at present scrupulously and I think even pedantically avoided
was the very essence of the trial, and his answers regulated the production of
evidence;
Stephen, 1 History of the Crim. Law 325 quoted in Twining v. N.J., 211 U.S. 78 at
103 (1908). He added:
Soon after the Revolution of 1688 the practice of questioning the prisoner
died out. Id., at 104.
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exist at common law. The defendant was not made a competent wit-
ness in criminal adversary proceedings until competency statutes were
passed, the first one in Maine 77 years after the passage of the Fifth
Amendment.3 4  There never was legal compulsion for defendant to
testify at his own trial conducted Vnder adversary rules.
Now any reformer which mistakes the two different kinds of legal
systems by confusing witness privileges pursuant to inquest procedure
with party rights pursuant to trial might not recognize prevailing reality
and reform the wrong system of justice. Consider the possibility that:
(1) An impractical accusatorial jury trial system had by 1900
died among the states and been replaced by a de facto in-
formal inquisitional model administered by police, defense,
prosecution and judges;
(2) That the Supreme Court reformed what it thought was an ad-
versary system;
(3) With "solutions" which may have caused the very inquest in-
formality that the Court, by reform, sought to correct.
A large order. Let's try it.
THE SECOND SYSTEM
How could a 12-man jury system developed from rural England,
survive the population logistics of Civil War (1860), the Industrial
Revolution (1870), immigrant millions (1880), or the New Town
of Ninety (1890)?"5
What does law do in a multi-million metropolitan area when con-
fronted with thousands of felony suspects36 carrying rights to party
trial by jury? It is called "Negotiated Justice. 3 7
Isn't this the point? After 1688, the adversary trial system became prevailing. Un-
der that system a privilege of silence would be immaterial if defendant couldn't testify
at all.
The privilege is to protect against all methods of interrogating before court, Grand
Jury or Legislatures which could tend to incriminate the holder of the privilege. On the
history of the privilege, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2250.
34. See, 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2250 at 296.
35. At the date of the Constitution of 1787, only two cities in the United States had
as many as 25,000 residents. By 1964, when the Supreme Court accelerated state
crime procedure reform, the Town of Loch Haven, Maryland, had that many.
In 1860, the ten largest cities would hardly resemble the 1960 Metropolis of 10 ur-
banized areas containing 25% of the country's population. 2 Int'l Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences 469-472 1968).
36. There was, in 1969-70, 36,619 criminal felony filings in the City of Los
Angeles, a rate of 523 per 100,000 of population-JuIcIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA COURTS, at
123 (1971).
37. See D. Newman, Conviction-The Determination of Guilt or Innocence without
Trial (1966); Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, I S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1927),
Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining; Compromises by Prosecution to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112
U. Pa. L. Rev. 865 (1964); Polstein, How to "Settle" a Criminal Case, 8 Prac. Law.
1971
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In 1970, less than 10 percent of felony defendants will receive the
jury trial they are promised. Mass crime demands an attrition process
administered by police, prosecutor and the courts.38  The American
Bar Association Report on Metropolitan Justice stated:
35 (1962); Rosett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea, 374 Annals 70-81; Skolnick, Justice
without Trial (1966); A Blumberg, Criminal Justice (1967).
38. FELONY DEFENDANTS PROCESSED
CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURTS, 1965
DISMISSED & OFF CAL.
FURTHER
PROSECUTION
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38. See generally, Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 Ill. L.
Rev. 385 (1951). Dallen Oaks broke down the figures on where went Chicago's re-
ported 1964's 225,000 arrests; The Hurdle Derby vis-a-vis: Transfers, Prelims, Nolle,
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The magnitude of guilty pleas to felonies on a national scale, has
been estimated to be as high as 95 per cent and as low as 69 per
cent.a
9
How do you persuade defendants to plead guilty or confess guilt to
an offense in open court when the crush of numbers require it?
There are ways. Have you ever wondered, for instance, if the greatest
civil rights could co-exist with the world's worst penalties? The rules
to plea negotiation are not complicated.
Multiply prosecutor's trading cards;4 0 give a little;41 trade or bar-
gain with party or parties in interest;42 convince defendant with good
S.O.L. D.O.L. Bench Jury and Plea are set out in Oaks and Lehman, The Criminal
Process of Cook County and the Indigent Defendant, 1966 U. Ill. L. F. 584. See, for
instance, figures for the National Opinion Research Center; Six-Stage Study from Vic-
timization to Trial Disposition, for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement.
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN THE FREE SOCIETY: 2100 incidents; 50 convictions.
39. Law Enforcement in the Metropolis, ABA Foundation, at 132 (1967).
40. Possible degress of felonies, misdemeanors, counts, multi-offenses, attempts, con-
spiracy and complex penitentiary release and probate possibilities form a veritable
patchwork quilt. See, generally, Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Ad-
vantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L J. 1149 (1959); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, Perspectives on Plea Bar-
gaining, Appendix A at 118 (1967). Comment, the Influence of the Defendant's
Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentences, 66 Yale L. J. 204 (1956). The armed rob-
bery indictment with twenty-two lesser pleas and combinations is discussed in Polstein,
How to Settle a Criminal Case, 8 Prac. Law. 35 (1962). For tables classifying second
to fourth offender by reduction see Weintraub and Tough, Lesser Pleas Considered, 32
J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 506 (1941-42); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bar-
gaining, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 50 (1968).
41. The New York Legislative Commission Study 1970 Figures are typical:
(1960-1967)
Indictments Returned:
Felonies 127,385
Misdemeanors 4,046
Total 131,441
Convictions
Minimum number of
felony charges reduced
to misdemeanor charges 51,480
Misdemeanor convictions 55,526
Felony convictions 41,889
Total 97,415
42. Though one would hesitate to allege that plea negotiation "often occurs in the
trial judge's chambers." But see Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36
U. Chi. L. Rev. 50, Footnote 73 at 81 (1968) (the result of a one-year study).
The ABA minimum standards Rule 3.3 boldly proclaims in § (a) that the trial judge
should not participate in plea "discussions" followed by § (b) where he can "permit
disclosure." Indicate whether he will concur if . . . and he may § (c) give the plea
agreement due consideration but otherwise he should reach an independent decision.
ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING
TO PLEAS OF GUILTY. (Tent Draft) (1967). How can a trial judge tailor sentence to
offender's past, present, future? Can he at same time honor brokers' agreements as to
pleas without "involvement," (the quintessence of inquest justice?)
The three most common arrangements are the charge, sentence recommendation and
plea to a lesser offense. See Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1; Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty
Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 866 (1964).
Most cases are disposed of outside the traditional trial process, either by a
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horse sense; 48 and then try and settle all but those cases too popular,
persistent or financed."
decision not to charge a suspect with a criminal offense or by a plea of guilty.
In many communities between one third and one half of the cases begun by
arrest are disposed of by some form of dismissal by police, prosecutor orjudge. When a decision is made to prosecute it is estimated that in many
courts as many as 90 percent of all convictions are obtained by guilty pleas.
Many oberburdened ocurts have come to rely upon these informal proce-
dures to deal with overpowering caseloads, and some cases that are dropped
might have been prosecuted had sufficient resources been available. [Supra,
note 39 at 132.]
That in Metropolitan areas parties in interest include judges seem indubitable. The
author in attendance at successive judicial conferences and seminars noted the counte-
nances of Cook County Illinois trial judges when their colleagues from sparsely popu-
lated downstate counties protest that they never get "involved" or participate in plea
negotiations. Basically, the problem is this: State-defendant attorneys ought to know
before plea what sentence will probably be. The judge has to know what the defendant's
record and past is so that he can discharge his legal obligation in order to tailor the sen-
tence to the offender. Advance notice or sentence peeking before pro-forma hearing in
aggravation or mitigation (after plea) sounds like involvement. Of course, if the judge
changes his mind, fairness requires him to afford the defendant opportunity to with-
draw his plea. See People v. Riebe, 40 Ill. Id. 565, 241 N.E.2d 313 (1968).
43. See Newman, Pleading Guilty for Consideration: A Study of Bargain Justice,
43 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 780 (1956).
Observations of the guilty plea process in recorder's court made it unmis-
takenly clear that the high rate of pleas was heavily dependent upon the in-
ducement of charge reduction to get a guilty plea entered . . . . [Supra,
note 39 at 132.1
See Steinberg and Paulsen, A Conversation with Defense Counsel on Problems of a
Criminal Defense, 7 Prac. Law. 25 (May 1961); Ohlen and Remington, Sentencing
Structure: Its Effect upon Systems for the Administration of Criminal Justice, 23 Law
and Contemp. Prob. 495 (1958). Bing and Rosenfield, A Study of Typical Lower
Court System, 7 Crim. L. Bull. 393 (1971).
It may well be that the defendant was afraid of receiving a severe sentence,
but as we pointed out in People v. Bowman, 40 Ill. 2d 116, 239 N.E.2d 433,
this fear resulted from no improper conduct by the authorities, but was the re-
sult of the course of conduct which the defendant himself had pursued. The
penalty of death was a possibility under the murder indictment, and a lengthy
sentence to the penitentiary was a possibility under all three indictments.
The fact that defendant's attorney advised him of these possibilities does not
support a conclusion that his pleas of guilty were improperly induced. People
v. Brown, 41 Ill. 2d 503, 505, 506, 244 N.E.2d 159, 160 (1969).
To hold that the sentence differential between life imprisonment and death
is such that a plea of guilty negotiated on this basis is involuntary would, of
course, prohibit negotiated pleas in all capital cases. We hold that the policy
considerations which permit a negotiated plea in a noncapital case (see People
v. Durrah, 33 Il. 2d 175, 210 N.E.2d 478) are sufficient to permit it in a
capital case. People v. Granberry, 45 Ill. 2d 11, 44; 256 N.E.2d 830, 832
(1970)-
44. A hallway about 20 feet long and four feet wide running between two
courtrooms is used as a conference quarters by the assistant prosecuting attor-
neys and the various defense attorneys who line up to talk with him and dis-
cuss pleas and sentences during the judge's first docket call or immediately
thereafter. The officer in charge of the case would customarily attend these
conferences in the hall on the matter of reduction of charge, pleas and sen-
tencing. During this time, the judge is either on the bench or in his chambers.
On occasion, a defense counsel would appear with his client before the judge
and state that his client was charged with armed robbery and that the assistant
prosecuting attorney had stated that this would be acceptable. If the assistant
prosecuting attorney happened to be in the room discussing another case,
with another defense counsel, the judge would call for him. The judge would
learn if this had been "okayed" by the assistant prosecuting attorney. If it had,
then the court accepted the plea to the reduced charge. (LAw ENFORCEMENT
(ABA), p. 132; see Oak's study of Illinois Indigents, supra, note 38.)
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By 1900, the realities of law enforcement required two systems of
criminal justice; one "book law", 45 the other, and the main one an in-
formal inquisitional process based largely on the power of a district at-
torney to make recommendations regarding reduction of or dismissal
of a charge.
Suppose rights kept "booklog" currency by guilty pleas "volun-
teered,"46 in fear of the dark side of the moon; the threat to prosecute
the offender for record offenses brigaded to exquisite sentence possi-
bilities.
The United States Supreme Court of the Fifties viewed, of all things,
the "voluntariness" of police station out-of-court confessions, concededly
and infrangibly once a crown jewel of real world Evidence at the adver-
sary trial.47 State criminal verdicts lacked due process when based on
admission of a coerced confession.4" Behind Mutt and Jeff station
45. Our administration of justice is not decadent. It is simply behind the
times ....
Bentham tells us that in 1797, out of 550 pending writs of error, 543 were
shams or vexatious contrivances for delay. Jarndyce and Jarndyce dragged
out its weary course in chancery only half a century ago. We are simply
stationary in that period of legal history ....
. . . . [W]ith the passing of the doctrine that politics, too, is a mere game
to be played for its own sake, we may look forward confidently to deliverance
from the sporting theory of justice . . . . [Excerpts from an address by
Roscoe Pound, The Date is 1903, reprinted in 57 A.B.A.J., 348 at 351, 352
(1971).]
46. See Foreword to Supreme Court, 1969 Term, Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional
Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1970); see, re waiver, Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
A plea of guilty is a surrender of the right to trial by adversary. It is part of the
prevailing waive and trade 'model.' In this system, pretrial Miranda silence rights are
to talk, what trial by jury is to plea. The trade keeps waiver 'voluntary.'
Robbery T Theft
Murder R Manslaughter
Battery A Disorderly Conduct
Ten-Year Sentence D Three to Five Year
I Sentence if
N Treated Right
Prison G Probation
Waiver is a wonderful legal method to make one false promise and a wrong both
right. As an equalizer, the doctrine describes two contraries-the de jure one always
pretender to a more commonplace real world opposite.
47. An out-of-court confession was a party admission admissible even though de-
fendant plead not guilty. The requirement that confession be not coerced but true
and voluntary after warnings, etc., is a very late 18th century refinement to adversary
trial confession law. Wigmore summarizes the history of the doctrines of confession
and says: "The development of the principle of safeguarding the use of confession has
been largely due (as may be later noticed) to the spirit of consideration for accused per-
sons, which grew up during the latter half of the 1700's and the fist part of the 1800's."
3 Wigmore at 229. It is this period when the trial by adversary rules obtained their
greatest currency in England and America.
48. The use of the Constitution to limit the power of states to utilize confessions was
first employed in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
It is interesting to note the contrast in the history of case reform in Fourth Amend-
ment search and seizure cases where the Supreme Court began reform in the 1930's
sitting as Chief Appellate supervisor of the Federal Courts. Thirty years of Fed-
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house processes49 lie, however, a much more material, but missed
inquiry.
Just what trial systems were confessions servicing by the 1950's?
But to answer that question is to pose one: And what, pray tell,
be confessions at inquest justice?
The answer is a plea in open court" or just what 90 percent of the
defendants in America were doing by 1964.
eral Court search in that area prompted Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In
confession cases, no Fifth Amendment analysis came until 1964. Till then, review in
State cases was accomplished by the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process of
fundamental fairness. See Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases
in the Supreme Court, 19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 35 (1962).
49. See Court's opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 452, citing Inbau
and Reid. Of course, police, interrogation is to formal adversary justice what judge and
magistrate interrogation is under inquest procedure. Query which is more humane, de-
sirable and better for the poor and oppressed who commit crimes? Only academia
though has displayed the happy courage in consistency to suggest that may be (as per
early authority) police should not question post arrest suspects at all.
• . . For full achievement of Miranda's values, a suspect needs even more
than a sympathetic explanation before his interrogation-he needs a sympa-
thetic advocate during the interrogation. Only in this way will most suspects
be able to assert a measure of control over the situation, overcome inevitable
nervousness, and avoid the impact of perceived (but irrelevant) social rules
operating in a situation structured and manipulated by a professional inter-
rogator. Griffiths, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of
Draft Protestors, 77 Yale L. J. 300 at 317 (1967).
50. By the end of the Middle Ages, a peer indicted for a felony by indictment pro-
cedure under Pleas of the Crown "In Pace Domini Regis," could be tried before either
inquest or adversary oriented tribunal. Depending, it was said whether Parliament was
in session.
• He may be tried before a court in which all his peers sit as judges of
both fact and law, presided over by a high steward who is but 'primus inter
pares'; on the other hand he may find that a high steward empowered 'ad
audiendum et terminandum' is his only judge, while a selected body of his
peers summoned 'ut rei veritas melius sciatur' plays the part, not indeed of a
jury, for they do not swear, but of a quasi-jury charged to find fact but not to
meddle with law.
I Select Pleas in Manorial and Other Seignorial Courts, p. ixvii Matiland, ed. (1888).
Distinguish the oath in primitive oath helping from the latter "Oath of cleric origin"
administered ex officio; a Supremacy Act in Elizabeth's time vested in the Crown's
Commissioners all Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction. Levy, in Origins, p. 95 adds:
She vested in her commissioners 'full power and authority. . . to visit, reform,
redress, order, correct and amend in all places within this our realm of England
all of such errors, heresies, crimes, abuses, offences, contempts and enormities
spiritual and ecclesiastical' by the 'most expedient' means at their discretion.
She specifically empowered them to examine suspects 'upon their corporal oath,
for the better trial and opening of the premises.' Although the regular ec-
clesiastical courts might punish only by ecclesiastical censures which graduated
to excommunication, the letters patent creating her Majesty's commissioners
for ecclesiastical cases authorized them to punish 'by fine, imprisonment or
otherwise.'
In the Colonies, the 'oath' was considered a form of torture, hence Rights of Self-
Incrimination protect freedom at any and all proceedings conducted under oath.
On the merger of God's Church with King's court, see Levy, Ch. 3, supra, note 11.
At inquest tribunals pleading to the mercy was the climax to magistrate interrogation
under oath by the inquest judges sitting as star chamber commissioners. As late as the
17th century, Lord Coke and the 'development of his common law of English rights,'
we find the clerk of the court writing:
. . . Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, after the example of wolsey, was in the
habit of taking his seat in the Star Chamber Attended by a number of the no-
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In 1650, poor John Udell was dealt with by a Star Chamber inquest
for his libelous and criminal spoofs at the prelates of Her Majesty's
church. Udell was urged:
Do not stand in it, but confess it and submit yourself to the Queen's
mercy before the jury find you guilty.'
And today? An estimated 90 per cent of felony convictions are
based on waiver of party trial, by plea. 5 2  But if state adversary jury
trials were all that infrequent why did police have to conduct pre-trial
interrogation to obtain person-party-suspect-defendant confessions at
all?
The answer was by 1964 to primarily encourage suspect "not to
stand in it"; (a station confession being useful for this purpose) and
only barely incidental for use if defendant persisted in demanding the
whole of the form, necessitating jury trial by adversary rules where de-
fendant would probably not, because of undoubted prior criminal record,
dare to testify about his impeachable self.53
The enormity of the court's mistake as to prevailing state criminal
justice "systems" is underscored by the President's Commission's find-
ings about this other system two years later:
The system usually operates in an informal, invisible manner.
There is ordinarily no formal recognition that the defendant has
been offered an inducement to plead guilty. Although the partici-
pants and frequently the judge know that negotiation has taken
place, the prosecutor and defendant must ordinarily go through a
courtroom ritual in which they deny that the guilty plea is the
result of any threat or promise. As a result there is no judicial re-
view of the propriety of the bargain-no check on the amount of
pressure put on the defendant to plead guilty. The judge, the pub-
lic, and sometimes the defendant himself cannot know for certain
who got what from whom in exchange for what.54
bility. 'The Court,' he tells us, 'is not alone replenished with noble dukes,
marquises, earls, and barons, which surely ought to be frequented with great
presence of them, but also with reverend archbishops and prelates, grave coun-
sellors of state, just and learned judges,' &c...... "And the Court was in the
reigns of Hen. 7 and Hen. 8 most commonly frequented by seven or eight
bishops and prelates every sitting day; in which times let me without offence ob-
serve that the fines touched not to the destruction of the offender's estate
and utter ruin of him and his posterity, as now they do, but to his corruption,
the Clergy's song being of mercy.' 16 Selden Society Selected Cases in the Star
Chambers, p. xl, xli (1902).
51. Taken from an account in Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79 Harv. L. Rev.
21, 28 (1966).
52. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE-THE COURTS, at 9.
53. See Spector, Impeachment Through Past Convictions: A Time for Reform, 18
DePaul L. Rev. 1 (1968).
54. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra, note 52 at 9. "Judicial supervision is not
an effective control when the system of plea bargaining is built on tacit rather than
explicit understandings." Id., at 12.
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Even so, reasonable men could differ whether proper reform should
consist of the restored reaffirmation of an adversary system, once before
in 1688 'brought back' by Englishmen in contest with a divine right
state. Rights apportionment in our Constitution, Hamilton once ob-
served a century after that, was supposed to be different.5 5  A king's
jury in service of party adversary rules share the system's assump-
tions, maybe true a time once only.
17th CENTURY ASSUMPTION 1971 REALITY
A religious oath to God and -The oath is nonreligious
perjury sanction guaranteed or unconstitutional.
that most witnesses would How often does a perjury
reveal only truth. indictment occur?
No rules excluding -Hundreds of rules
relevant evidence, excluding relevant evidence
because of the ways it was
obtained or presented.
These rules often have
nothing to do with the
probative force to the
offered proof. 6
55. The relationship between man and state in a society supposed to have been
founded on consent seemed different than the premise of rights from a government
totalitarian in pretence. Hamilton in the Federalist, one hundred years after an English
Common Law revolt, wrote:
It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in their ori-
gin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgements of prerogative
in favour of privilege, reservations of rights and not surrendered to the prince.
Such was MAGNA CHARTA, obtained by the Barons, sword in hand, from
King John. Such were the subsequent confirmations of that charter by succeed
ing Princes. Such was the petition of right assented to by Charles the First, in
the beginning of his reign. Such also, was the declaration of right presented
by the lords and commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688, and afterwards
thrown into the form of an act of parliament, called the bill of rights. It is
evident, therefore, that according to their primitive signification, they have no
application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the people,
and executed by their immediate representatives and servants. Here, in strict-
ness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain everything, they have
no need of particular reservations. 'WE THE PEOPLE of the United
States, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity do
ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America:' This
is a better recognition of popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms,
which make the principal figure in several of our state bills of rights, and
which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics, than in a constitution of
government.
But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a
constitution like that under consideration, which is merely inteneded to regu-
late the general political interests of the nation, than to one which has the
regulation of every species of personal and private concerns. Hamilton, The
Federalist at 438, 439 [Blackwell ed., 1948].
56. At any rate, what warrant is there for the federal courts to assume the
same supervisory control over state officials as they have assumed over federal
officers, even if that control could be effective? And the exertion of control-
ling pressures upon the police is admittedly the only justification for any ex-
clusionary rule. [Emphasis added.] Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
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No Fifth Amendment
A jury which at first
was to know everything
(friends, neighbors or
oath helpers) later
nothing about the case.
A system that could be re-
formed by, for instance,
allowing defendant to
testify about his life.
A public trial-("what
saved the English procedure
from degenerating into an
inquisitional system."59
-Defendant can testify
but it is unconstitutional
to comment when he does not.57
-A jury of neither friends
nor strangers but which
reads the paper.
-Almost all defendants
who go to trial have a record
to "impeach." The System
won't let them testify.5 8
-- See the Reardon Report-
Query: Is the free press
wanted.60
An assumption that there -Same, but Freud,
was either opinion or psychology and science
facts; witnesses could create in conflict. 61
original event by stating
it; witnesses either were
liars or told the truth.
No negotiated guilty pleas -Waiver based on number
or jury waivers encouraged of crimes, scarcity of
(unless incident to an resources serving a
inquisitional system). de facto inquest real
life 'model.'
An age when capital -Two centuries of prison
punishment was considered failure-the crime
an improvement to hard of punishment, related to
labor. trial procedure as
substance is to form.6 2
241 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev.
665 (1969); Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All American Mistake, 14 DePaul L. Rev. 81
(1969).
57. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
58. E.g., Impeachment by Prior Inconsistency, Specific Acts of Misconduct (mostjurisdictions) Reputation Witness, Prior to Criminal Act. Query: Do most first of-
fenders go to trial at all?
59. Levy, Origins, supra, note 3; "What Transpires in the Courtroom is public
property." Craig v. Harey, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
60. See ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS:
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
61. "This is another fiction, the idea that 'adversary proceedings,' can winnow
out truth, when in fact they are directed towards the victory of a cause, not truth."
Marshall, "The Evidence," 2 Psychology Today 48 (Feb. 1969 at 50). See Marshall,
Law and Psychology in Conflict (1966). See comment casting doubt on Rules of Direct
Examination by Behavior Analysis, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1620 (1971).
62. Menninger, The Crime of Punishment(1968). "Psychiatrists cannot understand
why the legal profession continues to lend its support to such a system after the scien-
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Ample community resources -No time, manpower, or
to provide adversary trial people for jury trials.6a
and jury.
A great number of capital -Promises.
offenses.64
No discovery of opponents' -Defendants' discovery
facts or witnesses. 65  of people case. 66
Straight witnesses. -Witnesses in many criminal
trials are, in fact, accom-
plices who for trade
promise and leniency
testify for state. 67
Proceedings initiated by -The worst of both systems.
victim. Sometimes victim-mostly
a police decision.
-Ambitious political-minded
prosecutors who try onerous
winners and settle rest
with practically no settled s
guidelines.69
tific discoveries of the past century have become common knowledge .... The dis-
coveries of Sigmond Freud and other scientists near the turn of the century led to new
understandings of human behavior that made a tremendous impact on almost all aspects
of human life-all except law." Id., at 91, 92.
63. In an urban county, jury delays in both civil and criminal cases are likely to be
measured in years. In Cook County Illinois, the jury demand backlog is 45,000 pend-
ing demands. REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS
(1969).
64. There was once in England 162 capital offences reduced to 2 in the nineteenth
century. See Dicey, Law and Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century, 29-
30 (1914). The brutal pillory was abolished in 1837 (7 Will IV and I Vict. C. 23).
65. The indictment or civil pleadings at common law were to frame issue for trial
discovery. Pre-trial discovery is symptomatic of a failing adversary fact-finding system
as 'compelled disclosure' is responsive to inquest practices.
66. See, Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 293,
316-19 (1960). What are the implications to "kept" evidence by adversary? Sup-
pose for instance defense must lay a foundation and show that a transcribed statement
of a witness was given to police before such a written statement or reports must be
disclosed to adversary. See, People v. Golson, 37 Ill. 2d 419 (1967). Would the pros-
pect of discovery lead to more or less transcriptions and written reports kept by police?
Query: Do adversary expectations lead to or from internal fact accumulation? Rea-
sonable men could differ.
67. Lord Hale in his "Historia Placitorum Coronae" put it for an earlier age(Henry 11-1300) this way:
A confession in order to obtain some other advantage, is either where the
prisoner confesseth the felony in order to his clergy, de quo infra, cap. 44. or
where he confesseth the offense, and appealeth others thereof, thereby to be-
come an approver, and thereupon to obtain his pardon, if he convict them, and
this lets in the whole learning touching approvers and approvement, which I
shall here open in the order that Mr. Stamford hath gone before me." 2 Hale's
Pleas of the Crown, 226 (Small ed. 1847).
68. See, for instance, the careful differences toward plea candor by judges who
might 'participate' or 'ratify' but at least be aware of bargains under F.R.Crim.
P. 11, 18 U.S.C.A., Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
69. See Tigar, Disquiet in the Citadel, supra. Note: The Unconstitutionality of
Plea Bargaining, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1387 (1970).
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An era of witchcraft -An era of technology,
movies, tapes, voice
prints, etc.
The adversary system which the Supreme Court says is required in
all courts by the Constitution strains an honest conscious lawyer's credi-
bility. He must at once know all about the client's involvement in the
crime, and yet nothing.70 Disassociation does not come so easy.
Lawyers cannot recommend that an innocent client plead guilty, but
the attorney must inform himself of the evidence ij order to properly
advise his client. Once, however, a decision for trial has been made,
lawyer then must fein ignorance: "It is not up to me to decide."
7 1
Professor Monroe H. Freedman caused a sensation when he wrote that
it is proper for a lawyer under the adversary trial system to put a witness
on the stand when he knows the witness will commit perjury.72  Can
you imagine determining the cause of a plane crash by these processes?
The adversary system of truth-finding was concededly unscientific
enough. The Supreme Court, however, aggravates the problem by
welding to it a host of "cloth rights" enacted not to filter truth but to
70. Do the Canons drafted in 1908 fail to reflect the practical realities of the sys-
tems they are designed to serve? For a discussion of Prosecution and Defense Attitudes,
see Skolnick, Justice Without Trial, 241 (1966). Griffith attributes to the adversary
battle model defined roles which at least in prosecutor's case veils and masks the
ambivalence he is supposed to have.
So long as the state's intertst is solely 'to put a suspected criminal in
jail,' the suspected criminal's corresponding interest, almost necessarily, is sim-
ply to stay out of jail. The roles of prosecutor and defense counsel are thereby
defined. The competing concerns of efficiency and abuse of power affect the
size of the role defense counsel is allowed to play but not the nature of that
role. Ideology, 79 Yale L.J. 359, at 383, supra, note 1.
71. See, Baily and Rothblatt, Investigation and Reparation of Criminal Cases
(1970).
Ch. 1, Section 26-"Tell your client to (a) speak with no one. Section 32. As to
your position as his attorney, make it clear that you alone will control the strategy of
the defense, decide what witnesses to call and engage in whatever discussions you deem
necessary with the prosecutor. Section 33. Warn your client about common police
strategems. Section 38. . . . It is necessary for you to avoid any overt reactions to
anything your client reveals to you. Section 44.
"§ 134. Should you demand a jury? ". . . You must know both the strengths and
weaknesses not only of your own, but also of the prosecution's case ...
"If you believe that the defense witnesses will be unconvincing and the prosecution's
case is powerful, consider the negotiation of a plea. Only do so, however, if you are
satisfied of your client's guilt and if you client is willing publicly to admit his guilt in
exchange for a plea."
Section 139. "If you decide to put the defendant on the stand, prepare him with spe-
cial care for his testimony will be scrutinized more carefully than anyone else's."
72. Fretdman, Professional Responsibility of hte Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 14 Mich. L. Rev. 1469 (1965)-(to which Freedman an-
swered "Yes."):
"1. Is it proper to cross-examine for the purpose of discrediting the reliability
or credibility of an adverse witness whom you know to be telling the
truth?
2. Is it proper to put a witness on the stand when you know he will com-
mit perjury?
267
1971
Loyola University Law Journal Vol. 2: 249
deter unfair means or methods used in obtaining evidence by law en-
forcement agencies. Suppose evidence is admitted which was gathered
unfairly, but defendant stands convicted by other different untainted
evidence. If the Supreme Court reverses the defendant's conviction,
"the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."17  If
it affirms conviction, the truth might win out, but the judges have
failed to chastise, punish or police offending parties in the only way a
court can-by reversing conviction.
No one seems to know at due process state trials just what is con-
stitutional harmful error. 74  Moreover, it is not certain whether the
Supreme Court's "remedies" for impropriety in the preparation or con-
duct of an adversary criminal trial are at all responsible to pre-trial or
no-trial informality and abuse that the decisions were supposed to cor-
rect. In Miranda, for instance, the Supreme Court saw the cure to
police pre-trial third degree in expanded Fifth Amendment silence
"rights. ' 75 In 1927, the Dean of Cornell Law School had written:
3. Is it proper to give your client legal advice when you have reason to be-
lieve that the knowledge you give him will tempt him to commit per-
jury?"
Id. at 1469.
See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmics: No. 22, Cander to the Court; No. 15,
Fraud; No. 37, Duty to preserve Confidences.
73. People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21; 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). Coolidge v.
N.H., -U.S.-(1971).
74. In Harrington v. Cal., 395 U.S. 250 (1969), a majority found that the improper
admission of two nontestifying co-defendants confessions placing a California robbery
defendant at the scene of the crime was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt within
meaning of Chapman v. Cal., 386 U.S. 18 (1967), although the minority of Marshall,
Brennan and the Chief Justice were sure that the Court overruled the very case it pur-
ported to apply. See Coolidge v. N.H., supra note 73.
The discovery of adversary due process rights creates all sorts of problems. Should
a newly enacted constitutional right apply to an old conviction obtained before the right
discovery?
In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the Court announced that only newly
discovered due process rights essential to the integrity of the fact-finding process would
become retroactive and apply in state courts to convictions which had become final be-
fore the date of the constitutional discovery. Thus, Mapp was not applied retroactively
because how police obtain real evidence does not affect whether or not the object proves
anything. The famous Gideon case was applied retroactively because a lawyer had by
1962 become essential in state criminal procedures.
The fair line-up legislative rules in the Wade and Gilbert cases were not given retro-
active effect because of their effect on thousands of prior convictions obtained with-
out them. It is difficult to conceive of anything more essential to the fact-finding proc-
ess at a criminal trial than the line-up testimony identifying defendant. For the latest
5-to-4 decision on retroactivity, see U.S. v. United States Coin and Currency, 39 L.W.
4415 (U.S., April 5, 1971). It is all very faint.
75. Here is your F.B.I. form:
"YOUR RIGHTS
PLACE ... . ................
DATE
TIME
'Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.
"You have the right to remain silent.
"Anything you say can be used against you in court.
"You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any ques-
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In the opinion of the writer, the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is the fundamental cause of the practice of the third degree.7 6
It is human to mistake effects as causes, but it may be tragic to re-
plant the tree that reaped the thorns.
Is it possible that improper searches, alley trials, coerced confessions,
immunity baths, squeal room justice, dropsy rituals, and unequal sen-
tences are effects of a massive failure of the very adversary system that
the Supreme Court sees as the cure of it all?
Any system of undifferentiated arrest, indictment, two blind advo-
cates, right kind of evidence, proof beyond doubt to the satisfaction of
all twelve and laissez faire appeal may be accompanied by pre-trial
abuse or no trial informality not as the court would have it despite
the system, but because of it. Perhaps the incremental pre-trial
cost of trial rights is what we should be looking at.
In Harper's Monthly for example, there once appeared an arresting
article called "The Great American Game 0: 77
The difficulty of getting at the facts in the courtroom induces a
certain type of mind to seek for this information elsewhere where
restraints are not merely less rigid, but are lacking altogether. The
tions and to have him with you during questioning.
"If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any
questioning if you wish.
"If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you still
have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
"I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights
are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want
a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises
or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has
been used against me.
Signed ---------
Tim e -.------------ ...........--------------- -------
Witness---------
Witness
Typical of comment is an article for the American Bar Association Journal entitled
Individual Rights in an Industrialized Society. Speaking of warnings and rights, but
waiver if suspect proceeds, California Supreme Court Judge Mathew Tobriner, obvi-
ously pleased, writes: "We have sought to avoid the extremes of an overstrict applica-
tion of a debilitating use of the rule and to evolve a workable formula." Tobriner,
Individual Rights in an Industrialized Society, 54 A.B.A.J. 21, at 22 (1968). Query:
If rights and waiver occur at some "inherently coercive" locale, what has changed?
Miranda sounds suspiciously like a washed sale for the poor and ignorant, and maybe
Adam Smith for the others.
I was Associate Director of a Law in American Society Project to teach rights in
high schools. It is very challenging to teach that a probable cause custody sus-
pect has rights not to answer questions the officer is paid to ask. As one 8th grade
black Caulfield put it: "Hell, man, we ain't neither got rights." For halfway to 'sic
transit Miranda,' see, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 Yale
L.J. 1519 (1967).
76. Irvine, The Third Degree and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 13
Cornell L.Q. 211, at 213 (1927).
77. Perkins, The Great American Game, Harger's Monthly, at 750 (Nov., 1927).
269
1971
Loyola University Law Journal Vol. 2: 249
result is the 'third degree.' Thus, while over tenderness for the ac-
cused causes many who are guilty to escape their just punishment,
the direct result is to cause many to suffer humiliation and even
physical torture of a nature not authorized by law even for the
guilty-and some of these sufferers are innocent of any crime.
Let us add, parenthetically, that a legal system that encourages
law officials to act outside of the law must be held accountable not
only for the direct ill consequences of such unlawful conduct, but
also for the general lawlessness which thus breeds. [Emphasis
added.] 8
And what happens when the ball is over? The re-arrest figures for
those released are even worse.7" Could it be different? Perhaps a first
step, proposed by Mr. Justice Harlan is the repeal of the fifty-state
code.80  Why not! As Mr. Justice Douglas is wont to remind us,
"Happily constitutional questions are always open.""1  They are any-
way under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.8 2  Disincor-
78. Id. at 755.
79.
PERCENT OF PERSONS REARRESTED WITHIN 30 MONTHS
BY TYPE OF RELEASE IN 1963*
83%
67%
63%
57%
47%
30%
Fine and Suspended Parole Fine Mandatory Acquittal
probation sentence Release or
and/or Dismissal
probation
* Crime in the United States
Uniform Crime Reports-1966, released 1967, pg. 34
80. "It is time, I submit, for this Court to face up to the reality implicit in today's
holdings and reconsider the 'incorporation' doctrine before its leveling tendencies fur-
ther retard development in the field of criminal procedure by stifling flexibility in the
States and by discarding the possibility of federal leadership by example." Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 at 138 (1870) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
81. Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, at 346 (1963) (Douglas, Jr., concurring).
82. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Supreme Court declared that
Louisiana and every other state in the Union in all criminal cases in which federal
courts would award jury trial must award them. A few years earlier in construction to
the same constitution, same clause, same state and same issue (jury trials), the Court
wrote: "The States so far as this amendment is concerned are left to regulate trials in
their own court in their own way." Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 at 92 (1875). In an-
other due process case, decided alter the Civil War: "The States so far as this amend-
ment is concerned are left to regulate trials in their own court in their own way."
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poration of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments in state courts8 3
would leave state justice (when modified by their constitutions) free
to enact space-age reform. Wasn't Federalism a safe experiment?8 4
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, at 92 (1875). In another due process case, decided
after the Civil War. The Supreme Court seemed emphatic:
We might go still further, and say, with undoubted truth, that there is noth-
ing in the Constitution to prevent any State from adopting any system of
laws or judicature it sees fit for all or any part of its territory. If the State of
New York, for example, should see fit to adopt the civil law and its method
of procedure for New York City and the surrounding counties, and the com-
mon law and its method of procedure for the rest of the State, there is nothing
in the Constitution of tht United States to prevent its doing so. Missouri v.
Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 at 31 (1879).
What a world of difference between the dynamics of fifty possibly different state
procedures; (federalism was a safe experiment) and one fifty-state constitutional model
which will change only if court personnel are willing to forego 'strict construction.'
In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) it was said that if a proceeding fol-
lowed usages of England and this country if was due process:
• . . but it by no means follows that nothing else can be due process of law
. . . to hold that such a characteristic is essential to due process of law, would
be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of
improvement. It would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeable-
ness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians. 110 U.S. at 528, 529.
Reasonable men could differ on which characteristic would be most like the law of the
Medes, the due process of fifty state procedures changeable by their law and legislation
of a one-nation due process. Chief Justice Burger (is) apparently unattuned to one na-
tion due process,
I find it somewhat disconcerting that with the constant urging to adjust
ourselves to being a pluralistic society'-and I acctpt this in its broad sense-
we find constant pressure to conform to some uniform pattern on the theory
that the Constitution commands it. (Jury required when confinement of 6
months to I year possible). (Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 at 77.
(1970) Burger, C.J., dissenting).
83. The whole theory of incorporation stands on the shakiest of 'precedent' as Mr.
Justice Douglas conceded in 1962 in Gideon, only a handful of judges until then (10)
espoused an incorporated bill of right to the Fourteenth Amendment phrase 'due process
of law.' See Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights into
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 746 (1964). One
hundred and seventy years after the amendment came Justice's Black and Douglas with
a few stands and pebbles of suppositions history; see Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949), audaciously sug-
gesting in Adamson v. California 332 U.S. 46 (1957) that all along the Fourteenth
Amendment included all the adversary federal amendments. "The only legal precedent
was the 1890 railroad court which invested substantive due process, discovered that
corporations were due process persons, doomed the federal income tax, decided Plessy
v. Ferguson and incorporated the first bill of right nor shall private property be taken
for a public use without just compensation." U.S. Const. Amendment V. See Bums,
The Death of E Pluribus Unum, 19 DePaul L. Rev. 651 (1971). It was the disgrace of
this and succeeding private property due process courts which may have led the victim
to a 'new deal' court on Black-Douglas. (5 to 4) to incorporate a less terrestial ver-
sion of due process. At least, Malloy v. Hogan (a 5-to-4 decision) was good enough
to concede where incorporation got started.
• . . The view which has thus far prevailed dates from tht decision in 1897
in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, which held the Due
Process Clause requires the States to pay just compensation for private taken
for public use. It was on the authority of that decision that the Court said in
1908 in Twining v. New Jersey, supra, that 'it is possible that some of the per-
sonal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National ac-
tion may also be safeguarded against state action because a denial of them
would be a denial of due process of law. 378 U.S. at 4, 5.
84. "Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the nation:
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
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In the short term, plea bargaining should be recognized for what it
is, a current necessity,85 not it is submitted, despite, but because, of the
rarified adversary trial system. Inquisition procedures prevailing today
should become honest", and regulated with checks, balances, or filters
in lieu of hardened rights. Exclusionary rules which do not deter and
are unrelated to proof should be abolished. 7
Multiple special interest appeals should be curtailed and"8 prelimi-
nary hearings reconsidered,' jury trials in civil cases should be re-
considered,9" criminal juries reduced, 1 and selected offenses reclas-
sified,9" or abolished. 93 Over the longer haul state constitutional amend-
State may, if the citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
. . If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 ct. 311 (1932) (Brandies J., dis-
senting).
85. The "United" profession in defense of plea negotiations is set out in Alschuler,
The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Negotiations, 36 U. Ch. L. Rev. 50, 51, 52 (1968).
86. Underwood, Let's Put Plea Discussions-and-Agreements-on Record, 1 Loyola
of Ch. L. J. 1 (1970). accord: Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 401 402, See People v. Nardi-Ill.-
268 N.E. 2d 389 (1971).
87. See the findings of Dallin Oaks' Exclusionary Rule Study, supra, 56. But see,
Coolidge v. U.S., supra note 73, rejecting reconsiderations of the exclusionary rule.
88. Illinois has a typical option-routes of appeal; Post Convuction Act, I11. Rev.
Stat. Ch. 38 § 122 (1970), State Habeas Corpus and Federal Habeas Corpus. See, for
instance, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
In New York, criminal appeals seeking constitutional release are beginning to para-
lyze the appellate docket.
The same picture emerges from California. Its 1969 Judicial Council reveals:
Despite the doubling of appellate court judges in the seven year span between
1961 and 1968 and the conscientious efforts of those judges, civil appeals are
being unduly delayed because of the volume of criminal appeals and the prior-
ity given them. Unless some change is made in criminal appeal procedures
there is every reason to believe that the number of appellate judges will have
to be doubled again within the next five years.
Most collateral attacks on criminal judgments come from errors in charge, assignment,
or trial preliminary. The 1971 California report lists the ten most often assigned
grounds for post conviction relief as:
1. Ineffective counsel.
2. Plea of guilty unlawfully induced.
3. Use of a coerced confession.
4. Use of evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure.
5. Use of evidence obtained through an unlawful arrest.
6. Infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination.
7. Unconstitutional suppression of evidence.
8. Use of perjured testimony.
9. Denial of the right to appeal.
10. Double jeopardy.
11. Unconstitutional selection and impeachment of the jury.
1971 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA REPORT, 53. Forthright pleas and better allo-
cation to appeal doctrine vis-a-vis, estoppel, laches, and res judicata would assist filtra-
tion to meritorious appeals.
89. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL JUDICIAL REFORM COMMITTEE SUPERIOR COURT, LOS
ANGELES COUNTY, (1971).
90. Id. recommendation, 13.
91. ld. recommendation, 15.
92. Id. recommendation, 11. Marijuana possession classed as misdemtanor.
93. See Morris, The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control (1970).
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ment should be enacted to afford genuine two-way fact-trial discovery.
This means, you know what about the Fifth Amendment.9 4
The role of juries (an early inquest 'reform') should be reconsid-
ered. Let magistrates or juries question suspects or defendants. 5
What would be wrong with video "partials."96 All offense procedures
should begin to be viewed in behavior terms; the rights and place of
counsel should come tailored form experiential historicity in subject-
object, victim analysis. What is needed are more studies directed to one
procedure per offense."
The courage of real reform" in post-trial prison and feudal prisons
will, it is submitted, come only when, not before, pre-verdict adversary
procedures are viewed as part and parcel of the one-same static
seventeenth century party system of criminal justice. As Chief Justice
Burger puts it, "If that system cannot be satisfactorily explained to en-
lightened people, perhaps we should re-examine some of its funda-
mentals." 99
94. "It is necessary to repeal the provision in question to enable the community to
protect itself against the evils of trusts and combinations." Terry, Constitutional Pro-
visions against Forcing Sell-Incrimination. 3 Yale L.J. 127, at 129 (1905).
95. Who Should Control Criminal Procedure, 13 I. Am. Jud. Soc. 107 (1929).
96. Sony, Ampex Motorola, R.C.A. and Decca all have the hardware for film re-
cordation or playback in deposition-trial combo. (See E.V.R. teacher in a cartridge,
Change, The Magazine of Higher Education (February 1971). There is nothing wrong
with "live theatre." See Griswold, The Standards of the Legal Professor: Canon 35
Should Not Be Surrendered, 48 A.B.A.J., 615 (1962).
97. "Nothing could be more unfair than a fair trial operating on the assumption
that in respect to behavior control all men are created equal." Menninger, supra, 62,
at 92.
"§ 134. Should you demand a jury?
"... You must know both the strengths and weaknesses not only of your own, but
also of the prosecution's case...
"If you believe that the defense witnesses will be unconvincing and the prosecu-
tion's case is powerful, consider the negotiation of a plea. Only do so, however, if you
are satisfied of your client's guilt and if your client is willing publicly to admit.
98. See the Report of the Judicial Reform Committee, supra n. 89, particularly the
exciting range of suggestions in its Appendix Ill (part (a) ) and "additional sug-
gestions," part (c), suggesting a merger of state and federal court systems (No. 152);
etc.
99. Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Center Symposium Report, at
71 (1968).
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